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A PRIMER OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
FRANK W. MILLERt
Originally given as a lecture to practicing lawyers, this little essay
has been revised for freshman law students to read near the end of
their basic course in Torts. It is very simply written, but it does as-
sume familiarity with basic doctrines of tort law. Its purpose is three-
fold: (1) to provide a basis for judging the significance of fault in
the law of torts; (2) to enable the lawyer better to evaluate proposals
to expand, contract, or otherwise change the rules in tort cases; (3)
to point out recent trends toward an expansion of liability without
fault.
Whatever the underlying principle or principles of tort liability
may have been in medieval times, and there is some doubt on the point,
it is reasonably clear that since about 1850 most people-even most
lawyers-in this country have thought that the single most important
principle underlying our law of torts is that there is no liability in
the absence of fault or wrongdoing. Although other important cases
could be selected from the same era, the decision generally credited
with firmly establishing that principle in American tort law is Brown
v. Kendall," decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
in 1850; the case owes some of its authority to the fact that the opin-
ion was written by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, one of our greatest
state court judges. Plaintiff and defendant each owned a dog and the
dogs were engaged in a fight. Plaintiff and defendant were both pres-
ent at the contest, and defendant, in order to separate the animals,
picked up a stick and began to strike at them while the plaintiff
watched. Defendant was not immediately successful, and the scene
of action shifted about. Finally, and of course at just the wrong time,
plaintiff was standing behind defendant, apparently without defend-
ant's knowledge. Defendant raised the stick to strike at the dogs
again, and on the back-swing, struck plaintiff in the eye with the end
of the stick, severely injuring the eye.
t Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
1. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
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Plaintiff brought an action for assault and battery, and the jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The case was reversed and re-
manded for a new trial for error in the instructions. But we are not
primarily interested at this time in the details of those instructions.
Our concern is with the broad principles announced in the opinion.
The major points are two; (1) "If the act of hitting the plaintiff was
unintentional, on the part of the defendant, and done in the doing of
a lawful act, then the defendant was not liable, unless it was done in
the want of exercise of due care adapted to the exigency of the case
.... . ,2and (2) the burden of proving lack of due care rested on the
plaintiff so long as the activity was lawful, though not strictly neces-
sary.
Now, that sounds pretty much like a theory of fault and it would
certainly suggest to most people that in order to be liable in a tort
action, one must do something bad. Nor is it insignificant for our
purposes that the burden of proving defendant's fault rests on the
plaintiff. But, let's examine the case in order to determine just what
the three key terms, "unlawful," "intentional," and "negligent" mean.
We may dispose of the idea of "unlawfulness" rather summarily.
Although the notion that one was liable for all the consequences of
an unlawful act was once a very virulent separate basis for tort lia-
bility, it has fallen into disrepute in more recent times except that
part of it which has been absorbed into the negligence concept. What
is left today is only the idea that the violation of a criminal statute
may, in certain situations, be either evidence of negligence or negli-
gence as a matter of law. Consequently we may safely conclude, I be-
lieve, that we have only two kinds of faulty conduct, so-called, to
worry about, i.e., intentional conduct and negligent conduct.
First, let's consider intentional conduct. Offhand I suspect that we
would all agree that absent some meritorious defense, if A deliber-
ately stabs B with a knife, A's conduct is faulty-morally, ethically,
legally. But that is far more than the law requires for proof of in-
tent. In most so-called intentional torts, the defendant need not be
aware, even objectively, that his conduct will interfere with the legal
rights of another in order to be found liable. A few examples:
Example No. 1:
Let us suppose that A and B were identical twin brothers, and that
defendant, C, was an intimate acquaintance of A, but did not even
know that A had a brother. Twin A and his friend C had long en-
gaged in a species of horseplay which took this form. Each tried to
surprise the other by sneaking up on him and slapping him on the
back vigorously before the unsuspecting one became aware of the
2. Id. at 297.
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stalker's presence. One day C spotted a person whom he naturally
assumed to be his friend, twin A, when the person was in fact twin B.
C crept up on B stealthily and slapped him on the back, his standard
conduct toward A. Unfortunately B in his surprise bit off the end of
his tongue.
Now the law is perfectly clear that since C intended to touch the
person whom he did in fact touch, in a way which is normally socially
unacceptable, both the state of mind and overt act requirements for
a battery are present, and battery is an intentional tort. Of course
C is liable to B, although it is clear that had it in fact been A, C would
not have been liable even for the unusual consequence, since A had
consented to that type of conduct. Unless we are willing to take the
position that it is somehow morally wrong for close friends to greet
each other boisterously, it seems clear that we have by hypothesis ruled
out fault when we say that there was no carelessness in making the
mistake. Yet we impose liability in tort.
Example No. 2:
A steals plaintiff's chattel and sells it to B, a bona fide purchaser
for value who has no reason to suspect that A is not the owner of the
chattel. It is certainly the law in most jurisdictions that B is a con-
verter, and that he must pay for the chattel again, this time to plain-
tiff. That is because the only state of mind requirement for a con-
version is that the defendant intends to assert over the chattel a do-
minion which is in fact adverse to the rights of the true owner. Of
course, B had that state of mind; he certainly regarded himself as
having a general property interest in the chattel. Liability will be
imposed although it is not arguable that B engaged in morally repre-
hensible conduct.
Example No. 3:
A walks on B's land thinking it is his own, and under such circum-
stances that any reasonably prudent person in A's position would
think so. Since A intended to walk on the land, he is guilty of trespass
to land and liable for at least nominal damages. Surely he did not
transgress any moral laws.
It can be argued, of course, that the rationale I use is not the cor-
rect one, at least in the battery case; that we can and should regard
this conduct as somehow generally wrongful, only to be countenanced
when a consensual privilege exists; that without the excuse of the
privilege this is really a case of moral wrongdoing. But surely that
is merely a rationalization in terms of familiar, expedient, and per-
haps even necessary, rules governing the burdens of pleading and
persuasion. Such rules cannot determine whether there was in fact
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any morally reprehensible conduct. Yet these examples are repre-
sentative cases, not freaks.
Most tort cases today are negligence cases, and by definition negli-
gence is conduct which is unreasonable in the light of the foreseeable
risk. Surely that sounds like fault, like conduct which does not meet
the requirements of morality. But before this conclusion is drawn,
a few facts about this concept should be noted. Over ten years be-
fore Brown v. Kendall was decided, the English case of Vaughn v.
Menlove 3 arose. In that case the defendant was apparently honest
but stupid and stubborn. In dealing with a damp hay-stack, he de-
cided, against advice, to arrange it with a vertical vent in the middle,
to permit it to dry out. The vent, in fact, presented a serious risk of
spontaneous combustion, and the hay was finally consumed by fire
which spread to his neighbor's land and did damage. In the ensuing
action for negligence, the defendant claimed he ought to be found
innocent because he did what he honestly believed to be for the best.
The court, however, adopted a different theory. Good faith was not
enough. In order to be free from negligence, one must act in at least
as satisfactory a manner as the reasonably prudent man. That idea
was implicit also in the decision in Brown v. Kendall. This means, I
believe, that negligence and morally reprehensible conduct are far
from identical things. If one does the best he can, within the limits
of his intelligence, he does nothing wrong morally or ethically in the
commonly accepted sense; yet he may be found negligent and, so, lia-
ble as a tortfeasor. Surely there may be, and I submit there often is,
liability without fault, even in the very heart of the fault concept,
negligence. Except in some relatively unimportant cases, those in-
volving children for example, negligence is tested by an objective
standard which does not take into account the inherent intellectual
limitations of the defendant,-limitations which of necessity weaken
his basis for choosing and narrow his range of choice.
One might argue that I have chosen the odd examples, freak situa-
tions. I do not agree that I have; but assume for the moment that the
examples I give form a relatively small percentage of the whole. Still
fault is not a requirement of liability if it need not be there. Require-
ments are minimum things. To illustrate the point rather dramati-
cally, assume that a statute provides that all men with black hair,
and all men with hair other than black, and all bald men, who know-
ingly and wilfully steal money shall be guilty of a felony. No one
would argue that a defendant had to have black hair to be convicted
or even that the facts about his hair had any legal significance. Fault
is as much a requirement in negligence cases as black hair would be
3. 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
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under such a statute. At least we may say that if negligence thus
defined is faulty conduct, we need a different definition of "fault,"
one which would bear no resemblance to any commonly-held notions
of what the word means in terms of morals and ethics.
But so far we have made the attack only on the enemy's strong-
holds. There has always been a tough residuum of situations in which
most courts have admitted that there can be tort liability without
even the watered-down concept of legal fault which I have been dis-
cussing. Passing by such things as blasting and wild animals, let's
examine instead the really huge group of liability-without-fault cases
which often are overlooked in a discussion of this sort. I refer, of
course, to the master-servant cases, where the doctrine of respondeat
superior fixes liability on the master though he is entirely free of the
thing the law calls fault, i.e., negligence. Surely, at this period in our
legal history, it is beyond dispute that whatever may be the basis of
the master's liability for his servant's torts, the result is non-fault
liability.
With this much introduction I now propose to point out some but
not all of the present trends toward increasing non-fault liability. I
believe that the most significant of these trends lies in the area of
master-servant law. There are several aspects. First of all, the em-
ployer's privilege of shifting responsibility to an "independent con-
tractor" has undergone great change. This has occurred in three
principal ways. It is the rule when the degree of danger to third
persons is great, that the duty to use due care is non-delegable, i.e.,
the employer is responsible for the negligent acts of an independent
contractor. The change has been simply this. More and more duties
are now regarded as non-delegable, so the area of exemption has been
cut down. Second, the courts have gone far toward finding that a
particular contractor is a servant rather than an independent con-
tractor. This they have accomplished by putting primary emphasis
on the benefits accruing to the employer rather than on the amount of
control and direction he is entitled to exercise.
Third, the courts have chosen to say, in more and more cases, that
while the employee, as between himself and his employer, is an inde-
pendent contractor, he is, as to third persons, a servant. All this has
led some persons to conclude that an employer is liable for the acts
of independent contractors in most cases, and that the cases of non-
liability are the exceptional ones. How the rule is phrased is not im-
portant, but the re-phrasing represents implicit recognition of the
trend toward increased liability.4
4. For a discussion of the problem, see Steffen, The Independent-Contractor
and the Good Life, 2 U. CH. L. Ruv. 501 (1935).
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The second major expansion of resprndeat superior is in the "scope
of the employment" concept. Here the rules are not stated differently,
but it is nevertheless true that juries today are permitted to find that
a servant acted within the scope of his employment on facts that
thirty years ago would have led to a directed verdict for the defend-
ant. The two most striking examples are, (1) the growing liability
of the master for the servant's intentional torts, particularly when the
servant has assaulted a third person, and, (2) the contraction of the
"frolic and detour" limitation of vicarious liability. In these cases
the courts increasingly tend to find the servant within the scope of his
employment in spite of wide deviations in space and time from his
normal duties. The formation of an intention to return to duty is
apparently enough to justify the imposition of vicarious liability.
Frequently, the only evidence is that the truck driven by the servant
has been turned and headed back in the right direction.
Next are two well-recognized exceptions to the respondeat superior
doctrine, the exemptions traditionally enjoyed by municipal corpora-
tions and charities. The immunities of municipal corporations have
been narrowed by treating as proprietary many functions which were
formerly regarded as governmental, and by expanding the nuisance
concept. Even more significant, however, are the changes in the li-
ability of charities for the negligence of their servants. Traditionally,
of cdurse, it was thought that the public benefit from keeping the
funds of charities intact outweighed the desirability of compensating
persons injured by the negligence of the institution's servants. This
idea crystallized in the form of the so-called "trust-fund" doctrine,-
that the funds of a charity were trust funds and so should not be dis-
sipated for purposes outside the trust. Very early, however, excep-
tions arose in various jurisdictions:
(1) when there was negligence in selecting the particular servant
as an employee the charity was held liable;
(2) when the injured person was not a recipient of the charity but
was rather a stranger to it, there was liability.
Those exceptions are, of course, anomalies, and fly in the face of the
trust-fund doctrine.
But more important are some recent decisions which go much
farther than these. Here are three of them. The first was a Vermont
case.5 In discussing the problem the court discovered that the issue
had never been presented to it for decision in its long history. The
court then, treating the case as one of first impression, chose to reject
the doctrine in its entirety as out of line with modern conditions. The
5. Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950)..
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court's approach is refreshing and the following quotation from the
opinion is instructive:
From our study of the law and after reading many decisions
from other jurisdictions pertaining to the subject-matter in-
volved in this case, we are convinced that we should decide this
case upon the broad question, namely: Is or is not a privately
conducted charitable institution liable for injury caused by negli-
gence? We are satisfied if we should not do so, we would start
this Court along a highway that would soon be shrouded in a
fog of doubt from which it would be difficult to emerge into the
sunlight of legal certainty.6 (Emphasis added.)
Even more significant is an Arizona7 case which likewise com-
pletely repudiated the doctrine of non-liability, for to do so it had to
overrule its own precedents. The court found no justification for the
continued existence of the immunity under modern conditions.
Although the Supreme Court of Illinois8 was unwilling to go quite
that far, it very significantly drew a distinction which points up the
whole problem in which we are interested. Convinced that it was
bound by its precedents to adhere to the immunity, the court indicated
a dislike for the doctrine and a desire to limit it. The limitation im-
posed was this: If there are non-trust funds in fact available, then,
and to that extent, the reason for the doctrine fails, and liability in-
surance is a satisfactory non-trust fund for this purpose. As we shall
see, this is not the only case in which courts have openly recognized
as significant the increased availability of liability insurance.
The next important trend deals with the decline of the contributory
negligence defense." The idea that plaintiff must be free from fault
in order to recover is part and parcel of the fault concept in negli-
gence cases. That concept does not merely demand that losses can
and should be shifted to so-called guilty parties. Rather, it permits
the loss to be shifted to a guilty party only by an innocent one.
Perhaps the most significant development is the expansion of the
last clear chance doctrine to cover more and more situations. One
point about this doctrine is of great importance: even though it oper-
ates within the traditional fault framework and is presumably based
on some notion of comparative wrongdoing, it in fact does not rest
on comparative fault. It depends entirely on a time-sequence of
events, and sometimes permits a very careless plaintiff to recover
from a defendant who has made a trival error of judgment. Con-
versely, if the time-sequence is not technically satisfied, a relatively
6. Id. at 125-26, 70 A.2d at 231.
7. Ray v. Tuscon Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951).
8. Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950). For a full citation of
other recent cases showing similar tendencies, see Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952).
9. See Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARiK. L.
REV. 1 (1947).
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innocent plaintiff may be barred against a rather obviously faulty
defendant. The doctrine has been described by one of this country's
most progressive tort scholars as a transitional one1 -- one which will
serve the purpose of bridging the gap between the old contributory
negligence rule and a developing rule that plaintiff's faulty conduct
should not bar recovery. Other examples are the dropping of court-
set standards of conduct, such as the "stop look and listen" rule, and
the "drive within the radius of your lights" rule.
On the legislative side, the enactment of comparative negligence
statutes as in Wisconsin, Mississippi, and some other states, stands
out. While those statutes operate within the fault framework, their
effect, of course, is to increase the number of recoveries.
Next are some developments within the automobile accident field.
Two of them are of considerable significance. The first is the judicial
expansion of the family-car doctrine which makes the head of a family
responsible for the negligence of members of the family driving the
car with his permission. The most significant step there is the frank
statement of the Minnesota court that the doctrine rests on ability
to bear loss and not on agency principles."
The second development is a legislative one, the enactment of
statutes which make the owner of a car liable for the damage caused
by the negligent act of anyone driving the car with his permission.
In addition, some states make the so-called "omnibus coverage" clause
a statutory part of all automobile liability policies, which has the
same effect as the statutes if the owner is insured.
Next, consider the problem of tort immunity within the family.
Several reasons, none of them very good, have been advanced for
holding that a child cannot sue his parent in tort. Exceptions de-
veloped, the first being liability for intentional torts of a particularly
vicious kind. More recently, however, the impact of insurance has
been considered, and at least one court found that an employer-
father's liability insurance was the most important reason for de-
ciding that he intended to waive his immunity from suit and emanci-
pate his employee-son. 12
Next, are the well-known extensions of manufacturers' liability.
Great strides have been made since Judge Cardozo decided the Mac-
Pherson case.13 There a manufacturer of a chattel, dangerous if de-
10. See James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704
(1938).
11. Felcyn v. Gamble, 185 Minn. 357, 241 N.W. 37 (1932). The court refused to
apply the doctrine to a family-used motorboat.
12. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930). But see, Levesque v.
Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954).
13. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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fectively made, was held liable for negligence to one not in privity of
contract with him.
The first really significant development was the use of the doctrine
of res ipsa, loquitur against a manufacturer in a products liability
case. The most dramatic use, perhaps, is in the bursting bottle cases.
By way of introducing the subject, it should be noted that there are
different views on this matter. 14 Some courts have taken the position
that the exclusive control requirement of res ipsa is satisfied only if
defendant had such control at the time of the accident itself. They
refuse to apply res ipsa in bursting bottle cases, then, because interme-
diate persons have usually handled the bottle. Most courts, however,
say that defendant need have exclusive control only at the time when
the negligence occurred; in these states if plaintiff can prove that
there was no negligent mishandling either by himself or others be-
tween the time the bottle left defendant and the time of the accident,
he may avail himself of the doctrine. Usually, the evidence needed
to meet such a burden is not great. But, let us examine the opinions
of the courts which say res ipsa is not available. They, far from deny-
ing recovery, frequently permit the case to go to the jury on precisely
the same evidence under a general negligence instruction: the result
is the same as under the other rule.
The next important step is the development of the rule that in a
certain limited area, usually food sold in sealed containers, the plain-
tiff may sue the manufacturer for breach of warranty even without
privity of contract. In a warranty action, of course, fault has no
place at all. The development has been based on such fictions as third-
party beneficiary contracts, or warranties running with title; but it
is there and is significant.
Of tremendous importance is the growing judicial recognition that
oftentimes in res ipsa cases there simply is no real evidence of fault.
This quotation from a concurring opinion in a California Supreme
Court case is enlightening:
I believe the manufacturer's negligence should no longer be
singled out as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover in cases
like the present one. In my opinion it should now be recognized
that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article
that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to
human beings. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co .... established
the principle.., that irrespective of privity of contract, the manu-
facturer is responsible for an injury caused by such an article
to any person who comes in lawful contact with it.... In these
cases the source of the manufacturer's liability was his negli-
gence in the manufacturing process or in the inspection of com-
14. See Note, 1951 WAsH. U.L.Q. 216.
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ponent parts supplied by others. Even if there is no negligence,
however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market. It
is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and
guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared
to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of
time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person
injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured
by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost
of doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the
marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the
public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the
market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for
whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who,
even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is
responsible for its reaching the market. However intermittently
such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they may
strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a
general one. Against such a risk there should be general and
constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to give
such protection. 5
Another significant development is the increasing use of the r'es
ipsa doctrine against multiple defendants. 6 This particular expan-
sion does substantial violence both to the exclusive control require-
ment of res ipsa, and to the more general principle that the burden
of proving fault rests on the plaintiff. In the leading case of Ybaerra
v. Spangard,:' the court applied the doctrine against a group of some
seven defendants, who were not joint tortfeasors. It was very likely
in the case that some one or more of the defendants were negligent,
but it is almost beyond belief that all of them were. The court held
that on a trial the jury might find some or all of the defendants negli-
gent, depending on the evidence; the plaintiff in fact recovered a
judgment against all the defendants, at a subsequent trial. 8 The case
certainly shows an increased willingness to recognize the importance
of giving plaintiff every sort of procedural aid to prove his case, but
more-it throws doubt on the applicability of the fault concept in
complicated multiple-party cases. The same court, in Summers V.
Tice," permitted a plaintiff injured by only one of two negligent tort-
feasors to recover a joint judgment against both in the absence of
proof by one of them exculpating himself and placing responsibility
15. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 150 P.2d 436,
440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
16. Note, 1954 WAsH. U.L.Q. 215.
17. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944)
18. Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal. App. 2d 43, 208 P.2d 445 (1949).
19. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
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on the other. The decision unfortunately is obscured by the court's
flirtation with the joint-tort concept.
Originally in some jurisdictions absolute liability in blasting cases
was confined to trespassory invasions. More recently this limitation,
based on entirely archaic procedural distinctions, has been abandoned
by some courts, and absolute liability has been imposed whether the
damage resulted from rocks thrown on the land, or from vibrations.
Two quite different types of modern statutes, operating with sub-
stantially different degrees of directness, tend toward expansion of
liability. The first places a duty of lookout on trains operating in
open country, and the second makes the defendant's liability insurer
a proper named defendant.
These heterogeneous things have one common element. They all,
directly or indirectly, as specific rules or as jury persuaders, make
the imposition of liability easier, and so in fact make liability without
fault more common.
The object of this discussion has been to show that lack of any neces-
sary relationship between legal liability and immorality is an im-
portant fact. It must be kept in mind constantly whenever one tries
to evaluate intelligently the myriad of current proposals to extend or
restrict liability in this field, in that:
(1) It makes it clear that any change which would increase the
areas of admitted non-fault liability is not necessarily a "radical
idea,"-not "out of line with our existing economic and political
institutions" or our "ideas of morality or ethics";
(2) It will enable us to consider the problem and make our de-
cision on the merits rather than on the basis of emotion, and I
urge that none of us as lawyers can or should dodge the job of
playing a responsible part in policy formulation in this area;
(3) Finally, it will help to end the practice of disguising our
value judgments behind a facade of outmoded, inaccurate doc-
trine-doctrine which in fact does not meet the test of practical
realistic application in our courts.
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